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Abstract This paper reflects on the change of relations
among participants in nanotechnology governance
throughtheirparticipationingovernanceprocessessuch
as stakeholder dialogues. I show that policymaking in
practice—that is, the practice of coming and working
together in such stakeholder dialogues—has the poten-
tialfortwo-foldperformativeeffects:itcancontributeto
the development of trust and mutual responsibility on
the part of the involved actors, and it may bring about
effectsontheformationofboundariesofwhatissayable
and thinkable in nanotechnology governance. Three
vignettes about the work of the German NanoKommis-
sion indicate the development of new relations of trust,
recognitionandmutualresponsibilityamongactors.Itis
concludedthatgovernanceinpracticecanassemblenew
collectives in which relations of trust are the glue
holding the complex structure together. While such a
consensus-based progress may be favourable for
smooth technology development, it can be considered
problematic if evaluated against the ideals of delibera-
tive democracy, which often form the premises on
which public engagement is based. Stakeholder forums
were set in place with the intention of including various
actors, but this is Janus-faced: if a dialogue becomes
encapsulated in new governance networks, new exclu-
sions can arise. For example, a policing of which
information is released to a wider audience can occur.
Keywords Nanotechnologygovernance.German
nanotechnologypolitics.Governancenetworks.
Deliberativedemocracy.Performativetrust.Public
dialogue.Publicengagement
Introduction
On a November morning in 2009, I conducted my last
interview in a week of meeting people involved in
nanotechnology governance in Germany. In these
interviews, a narrative approach was pursued that
aims to elicit detailed descriptions of a situation and
how it was endowed with meaning [36, 37]. Hence,
questions would be asked such as ‘What was the first
time there was any kind of consciousness in your
agency that nanotechnologies might be worth a
second thought?’ and ‘Could you give me a concrete
instance of when that actually happened, using as
much detail as you can?’ Thus, that was what I did or
tried to do on this particular November morning, as
well. Except that this time it did not work. I was able
to elicit only very general accounts of what had
happened in the stakeholder meetings or public
dialogues in which the interviewee had been partici-
pating. For example, the interview showed the follow-
ing pattern of question and response:
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e-mail: heidrun.am@univie.ac.atInterviewer: ‘You mentioned that it took much
time to agree on a definition of nanotechnology
within the varied group of stakeholders. The
final position paper presents one definition.
Could you walk me through the process of
reaching this agreement?’
Respondent: ‘Well … we started with defining
nanotechnology within the range of 1nm and
100nm, but some environmental organisations
had objections to drawing the line at 100nm
because there could be risks above this range.
So, we discussed it further in a long process and
finally we reached an agreement.’
Rephrasing the question several times did not help,
and the answers to other questions were similarly vague
and undetailed. I introduce this interview quote here not
for its content but to show that the elicited material was
definitely far from being a rich narrative account of the
practices of nanotechnology governance. In the course
of the interview, as I wondered why things were now
going wrong, I considered that there could be several
reasons why the interview was unproductive. Did the
interviewee just not understand what I meant when I
described my interview style in the beginning, or was
the respondent simply not talkative? Nevertheless, the
consistencywithwhichtrickytopicswerecircumvented
throughout the interview gave me the impression that
the respondent did not want to tell me what I needed to
know. Frustrated about the interview going badly and
feeling that it was a waste of our time, I began to
concludetheinterviewafteronlyabout40minutes.Idid
not mention anything about my evaluation of this
interview to my respondent. But—as Paul Watzlawick
put it in his meta-communicative axiom of his commu-
nication theory: you cannot not communicate. Indeed, I
must have expressed my disappointment about the
interview nonverbally.
And at that point the interviewee suddenly started to
talk. What followed was a rich description of how these
dialogue processes had developed in the last four years,
how people got to know each other, how civil society
organisations became increasingly knowledgeable
about the topic, and how they were able to lead more
sophisticated discussions now than in the beginning.
The respondent’s concluding statement was
Respondent: ‘Thereby, we [the stakeholders]
are taken more seriously, as partners on an equal
footing. That was not like this from the
beginning. By knowing each other better, one
trusts the other and [then] talks about things that
must not be made public, but this is very
important background information. … Yes, I
think, it is important in such matters to trust
each other and to be able to ask the questions
one could not ask if the discussions were
public.’
I nodded and accepted the apology, as it were.
Only months later, when I had the opportunity to
participate in a workshop on nanotechnology and
trust, did I recall the anecdote, which made me think
further: Which consequences for democratic gover-
nance do the relations have that are built among
stakeholders when they gather on a regular basis to
talk about nanotechnologies? I argue that members of
stakeholder forums are temporally united by relating
different interests to the common project of ‘the
responsible development of nanotechnology.’ A ‘we’
in governing can arise among previously disparate
subject positions which are transformed by new
relations of trust und mutual responsibilities.
Context: Public Engagement in Nanotechnology
Developments in nanotechnology politics must be seen
in the broad context of changes in policy-making away
from government towards governance, ‘governance’
being a term introduced to capture a variety of actors,
institutions and sites involved in doing politics, in
formulating policy problems and in finding solutions
to key problems. Between state institutions and social
organisations, among state institutions, and in sub-
political movements and citizen groups, a range of
new political practices has developed that develops
political agendas apart from the institutions of the
classical modernist states ([13]:i). Such new political
practices can take the form of citizen juries, citizen
movements, collaborative dialogues, stakeholder
forums, informal policy networks, officially assembled
governance networks, etc. New in these practices are
not only the way of conducting policy (new sites, new
actors), but also the themes (ibid., p. ii).
At thesame time,a new ethos is guiding these efforts,
an ideal of participation, inclusion and deliberation.
There are considerable differences in the conception,
aims and means of deliberative democracy that are
116 Nanoethics (2011) 5:115–128beyond the scope of this article. But a common
denominatorofdeliberativeidealsisthat,inademocratic
polity, political decisionsshall be taken byfree and equal
citizens [24]. Deliberative democracy implies that
collective decisions shall be taken by all those affected
by the decisions; and decision-making itself shall be
characterized by a reasoned exchange of arguments
among the participants ([6]: 8). In short, deliberative or
participatory governance settings shall be more inclu-
sive, less hierarchical and consensus based.
In particular the field of emerging technology,
which was classically dominated by expert knowl-
edge and technocratic decision-making in closed
bodies, was a site where settings of participatory
governance developed after food scandals such as
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), after social
movements arising around a rejection of genetic
modification, and in the light of increasing uncertain-
ty of the application of new scientific knowledge and
the consequent dislocations of conventional ways of
regulation. Both motivations (an inclusion of a wider
public to preclude a contestation, as well as uncer-
tainty about how to deal with this new thing) rank
high in nanotechnology governance and have entailed
a demand for public engagement in the governance of
nanotechnology. These increased efforts in public
engagement in nanotechnology governance are inter-
twined with a perceived deficit of trust in technolo-
gies and the attempt to create good relations between
technology and society ([3]: 203). From the begin-
ning, a demand for engaging the public was articu-
lated with nanotechnology—a demand for inviting
voices, for understanding public understandings, for
learning the lessons and for doing the right thing the
first time [2, 7, 17, 21, 22, 28]. Consequently, many
and various efforts of public engagement in nanotech-
nology were initiated.
While there was an embracing of public engage-
ment from the beginning, the ethical, legal, and social
issues (ELSI) literature also conveyed a certain
suspicion that such engagement might primarily serve
to convince publics ([3]: 206, [5]: 14) about the
benefits of nanotechnology rather than offer them real
choice and decision-making power. Such an instru-
mental use of participatory governance runs counter
to ideals of transparency and inclusion. Increasingly,
demands arise in the science and technology studies
(STS) community for a critical engagement about the
challenges and pitfalls of public participant and public
engagement [5]. This paper contributes to that
discussion by drawing attention to the performative
side effects of bringing people together that are
commonly not taken into consideration. What does
it mean—set against the background of deliberative
ideals—that the interviewee defined the stakeholder
forums as closed circles in which discussions could be
led distanced from the public?
I argue that stakeholder forums like the German
NanoKommission can contribute to the forming of
new identities and the creation of a new style of
governance that is marked by new relations of trust
among actors who might have previously entered into
controversies about an emerging technology. The aim
of the article is not to diminish the considerable efforts
and outputs of stakeholder dialogues but to trigger
reflections on the effects of such participatory gover-
nance, which might not be immediately obvious.I show
that policymaking in practice—that is, the practice of
coming and working together in such stakeholder
dialogues—has the potential for two-fold performative
effects: it can contribute to the development of trust and
mutual responsibility of the involved actors, and it may
bring about effects on the formation of boundaries of
what is sayable and thinkable in nanotechnology
governance. I assume that the danger of this is that the
discussions become encapsulated and dislocated from a
wider audience—thus, I point to the danger that the
practice of participation can turn its premises of
inclusion and transparency into its opposite.
Performative Dimension of Trust and Policy
as Practice
The composition of nanotechnology stakeholder forums
often starts from the assumption that a balance of
interests should be represented in the forum. For
example, when the UK Department of Environment,
FoodandRuralAffairs(Defra)setupitsnanotechnology
stakeholder forum, it aimed to bring different interests to
the table. The stakeholder forum participation was based
oninvitation.Theorganiserstriedtoarrangeabalanceof
interests by bringing together green NGOs, consumer
groups, academics and industry stakeholders so they
wouldchallengeoneanotherwithinthegivensettingofa
stakeholder forum. The literature indicates that such
forums seem to demonstrate that incorporation into
political rule is ideally taking place across public and
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to overcome incommensurable interests by constructing
a shared information basis and mutual understandings
([8]: 545).
The theoretical perspective of this paper rejects
simplified premises onto which stakeholder dia-
logues are formed and invites for considering them
as more complex and fluid arrangements. Even
before the stakeholder dialogues start, dichotomies
(lay—expert, public—private, NGO-industry) and
respective interests might not be as stable and
predetermined as is often perceived but they are in
fact dependent on context and on discursive
constructions of who counts as an actor and who
does not; and on how, through practices of
articulation and inscription, policy problems rise
and actors position themselves around them [11]. In
addition, the clarity of political cleavages or the
continuity of what political actors stand for might be
more vague and elusive in an age in which politics goes
beyond classical institutions of the state, where new
media have created new political stages, and where the
publics become highly fragmented and individualised
[14]. Apart from that, I argue that the participation of
stakeholders in these forums and series of meetings
mobilizes their understanding of the policy problem and
changestheroletheytakeinthepolicyfield.Thus,Iopen
the way for a reflection of the concept of stakeholder
forum as more fluid complexes in a two-fold way: the
premises on which they are built are not as clear-cut as
often perceived, and their enactment leads to transfor-
mation so that the composition of the forum may end up
as something quite different from its initial concept.
By the term ‘enactment’, I use Hajer’s definition:
‘when people act, they bring events and structures
into existence and set them in motion, producing
constraints and opportunities that were not there
before they took action’ ([14]: 7). Thus, acting in
governance networks, for example in meetings, by
correspondence or when composing drafts, creates
new perspectives—not only on the issue at hand, that
is, nanotechnology, but also—and this is my focus—
on relations among the actors. That identity building
is taking place in deliberative policy making has
already been pointed out in the literature on deliber-
ative policymaking and in ‘policy as practice’
approaches. As Wagenaar and Cook write in a chapter
of Maarten Hajer and Henk Wagenaar’s well-known
book on deliberative policy analysis [35]:
‘Problem solving in the practice paradigm is
[…] more the discovery of preferences, posi-
tions and identity; it is finding out where one
stands in relation to the problem at hand, what
we value in this particular situation, who we are
in relation to the others who are involved in the
issue. Success is not measured in terms of the
one best solution, […] but rather, as Taylor
observed, in terms of transitions.’
([35]: 168)
Meetings in nanotechnology stakeholder forums or
commissions thus involve, first, members scanning the
other people, and then, reflecting and positioning
themselves and the institution they represent toward
what they consider to be the relevant issue in nanotech-
nology. This is a dynamic process, and transformations
are triggered by the participation in the events. Innes &
Booher make a similar observation:
‘In collaborative policymaking, agreements are
only a small part of the purpose and the
consequences. The real changes are more
fundamental and typically longer lasting and
more pervasive than agreements.’
([15]: 55)
Innes and Booher talk about changes that are
achieved through collaborative policymaking such
as shared meaning, networks or new ways of
understanding. To that list I would add trust
relations and mutual responsibility. Even if the
generation of trust is mentioned in the deliberative
policy making literature, it is not considered from a
performative perspective. I suggest that we can
beneficially think further about ‘what collaborative
policymaking does in practice’ by introducing Bron
Szerszynski’s considerations on the performative
dimension of trust. My aim is to complement Innes
& Booher’s and Wagenaar & Cook’sa r g u m e n t st h a t
identities change, by an explanation of what this
transformation of identities triggers. For this pur-
pose, I draw on a paper by Bron Szerszynski [31]
that suggests that performing trust transforms social
identities and relationships.
Searching social sciences’ databases for work on
trust generates abundant relevant hits. These studies
on trust cover, however, diverse parts of our social
reality. Some research finds that trust works as a
regulatory mechanism in society that can, for
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other studies see it as a public good [23]t h a t ,f o r
example, plays a role in the acceptance and percep-
tion of risk ([27]: 961). Depending on its application,
the definition of the concept varies and yet often
remains vague. Luhmann even starts his book on
trust by reflecting on whether it is prudent to
consider moral words of everyday usage for socio-
logical theories ([20] preface). He famously argues
that the main function of trust is to reduce the
complexity of reality and that trust always refers to
expectations about actions in the future.
Regarding trust relations, an important aspect of
stakeholder forums is that people meet in person. In
his essay on living in a post-traditional society,
Giddens [9] points out how trust necessarily often
has to be vested in a multiplicity of abstract systems
in contrast to traditional systems of trust, which
develop based on face-to-face meetings. He says:
‘The disembedded characteristics of abstract
systems mean constant interaction with “absent
others”—people one never sees or meets but
whose actions directly affect features of one’s
own life.’
([9]: 89)
Although Giddens thus stresses the importance of
the shift of locations of trust, he does not abandon
traditional forms of trust. On the contrary, he suggests
that personalized trust, basedondeliberatelycultivated,
face-to-face relationships, might be increasingly impor-
tant in a period of high modernity (Misztal 1998: 90).
This might be true for nanotechnology stakeholder
forums: The person who represents industry associa-
tions or NGOs in these meetings becomes the ‘face’ of
the stakeholder organization he or she represents, and
the regulargatherings allow for developing interpersonal
relations among these ‘faces’.I fw ea p p l yw h a t
Luhmann [20] says about other human beings bringing
complexity into the world due to the unpredictability of
their actions, then trust is first and foremost vested in
other people by recognising them as the ordering centre
of the systems of actions. Trust is in this respect a
generalised expectation that a person will deal with a
situation according to his or her personality. ‘Trustwor-
thy’ applies to the person who stays consistent with
what he or she consciously or not has told about
himself or herself ([20]: 48).
Giddens’ focus is on deliberately cultivated, face-
to-face relationships. He and Ulrich Beck emphasise
in their work on reflexive modernity and the post-
traditional society that mechanisms of trust shift from
being taken as granted towards an active trust ‘that
has to be energetically treated and sustained’ ([10]:
186). Bron Szerszynski [31] embraces the notion of
‘active trust,’ but he suggests that trust is active in a
stronger sense. Instead of considering trust as a
cognitive judgement, Szerszynski proposes to see
trust as ‘an attempt to bind the ‘trusted’ into a
relationship and attitude of responsibility—and thus
perhaps to alter their behaviour—through the taking
up of a position in a social ritual’ ([31]: 239,
emphasis added). He joined performative theory on
language and speech acts with the trust concept.
According to the performative theory on language set
out by Austin, speech and gestures are performing
acts that can change a definition of a situation or its
constituent social relations (Austin 1975 cited by
[31]). Austin’s classical examples were that when I
say ‘I baptize you’ or ‘I bet’, I am not describing a
situation but rather I am doing things with words;
these are examples of performative sentences ([1]: 6).
Austin differentiated between ‘illocutionary’ acts (to
inform, to warn, to order) and ‘perlocutionary’ acts
(the achievement by saying something, e.g., a person is
alarmed or astonished) (ibid: 108, 120). Accordingly,
the expression of trust can be interpreted as a perlocu-
tionary act that may aim at bringing about effects, such
as being persuaded or being alarmed, in the addressed
party (Austin 1975 cited by [31]: 246). Thus the
language of trust or distrust might not be so much
about representing the world, but it is in a way self-
fulfilling: if everybody behaves as if everybody is
trustworthy, then they will be so ([31]: 246).
‘From this perspective, trust is less a matter of
individual discernment and cognition and more
like a kind of social glue that binds people into
generalised relations of mutuality.’
([31]: 247)
That is to say that Szerszynski introduces an
interpretation of expressions of trust as an attempt to
make the entrusted fulfil obligations, to make some-
body do what he or she does normally not do. He
gives the example of a resident approaching the
operator of a local chemical plant to elicit safety
information. This act could be interpreted as an
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feel I trust you’) or as declarative (‘I declare my
dependency on you’)( [ 31]: 248). The latter is what
Szerszynski focuses on: directive declarations that
seek to bring about perlocutionary effects on the
addressee, for example, that the company shall live up
to its safety responsibilities (248).
Thus, if an exchange of information, ideas and
positions is taking place in these stakeholder forums—
like the respondent in my interview said: ‘By knowing
each other better, one trusts the other and [then] talks
about things that must not be made public’—the
participants are ‘performing illocutionary acts of
‘entrusting’ on others’ ([31]: 247), which bind the
members of the forum or commission into a relation-
ship of responsibility. In the following, I draw on
examples of nanotechnology politics to illustrate
further how performative trust in new governance
relations can cause identity changes.
Performing Borders: What is Sayable
in Nanotechnology, and Where?
Vignette 1—From an Outsider to a Trustworthy
Partner
Let’s review the full quote problematised in the
introduction of this paper:
Respondent: ‘Thereby, we [the stakeholders]
are taken more seriously, as partners on an equal
footing. That was not like this from the
beginning. By knowing each other better, one
trusts the other and [then] talks about things that
must not be made public, but this is very
important background information. … Yes, I
think, it is important in such matters to trust
each other and to be able to ask the questions
one could not ask if the discussions were
public.’
Approached from the perspectives of the intro-
duced theoretical frame, it can be seen how the
respondent stressed a temporal dimension in which a
transformation of relations among the stakeholders
involved in the forum took place. The interviewee
mentioned first how civil society organisations would
become more knowledgeable about the subject and
then concluded that this transformed their role in the
stakeholder forum from that of outsider to that of
being one of the inner circle. At the same time, the
people who participated in the forums as representa-
tives of their organisations, companies, unions or
political institutions learned more about each other
and became acquainted with each other. Thus,
through the members enacting deliberations on
nanotechnology, the way of relating to each other
changed to become relations between trustworthy
partners. By exchanging information with each other
that previously would have been disclosed only to
certain members of the forum, it was not only acted
upon the relation of trust, but the relation was at the
same time extended to a relation of mutual responsi-
bility. Individuals became bound within each other so
that to pass on secretly told information would result
in a serious disruption of any carefully accrued
relation—this disruption would occur not only with
the actor whose secrets one had been revealed, but
might result in one being discredited beyond the
group and indeed their organisation losing credibility
as a partner in nanotechnology governance.
The respondent took part in several stakeholder
dialogues in Germany, particularly in the German
NanoKommission, which was created after two big
NanoDialogue events organised by the Federal
Environment Ministry in 2005 and 2006. As the
central national dialogue committee, the Nano-
Kommission took over the task of evaluating risks
and benefits of an emerging technology about
which there was still insufficient knowledge. It
began its work in late 2006 and established a
regular stakeholder dialogue. Participants were
representatives of government (ministries and agen-
cies, federal and states), industry, science, trade
unions and civil society organisations. The three
NGOs present were the BUND (Friends of the
Earth Germany), the Federal Consumer Protection
Agency (Verbraucherzentrale) and a citizen initia-
tive on environmental protection (Bundesverband
Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz). Industry—repre-
sented by industry associations, for example, the
AssociationofChemical Engineers(VCI),andbymajor
companies such as chemical companies BASF, Merck
or Evonik, and smaller nanotechnology-based-
companies such as LtN Nanovation AG—outnumbered
in the commission itself as well as in two of the
commission’s three working groups. Three working
parties, ‘Chances for Environment and Health’, ‘Risk
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ble Development of Nanotechnologies,’ tackled those
specificareas.Thetitlesoftheworkingpartiesrevealthe
work programmes the NanoKommission considered
important:namethechances,gatherinformationonrisk,
and reflect on whether and how we can govern despite
uncertainty (which measure could be taken when
lacking evidence). The chair of the NanoKommission
was Wolf-Michael Catenhusen, a former state secretary,
former employee of the Federal Ministry for Research
and Education, and a member of the German Social
DemocraticParty.Hewasalreadyanimportant figurein
biotechnology debates in the 1990s and, apart from the
NanoKommission, he also sat on ethics committees in
2009.
The efforts of building a NanoKommission must
be seen against the background of the German
regulatory discourse on nanotechnologies in which
an open, flexible regulation was demanded that would
enable innovation. These conceptions were well out-
lined in a text by a former departmental leader of the
German Environment Ministry, Uwe Lahl. He sug-
gested [19] that codes of conduct could replace state-
controlled, legal regulation in nanotechnology gover-
nance. Instead of regulation by law, regulation shall
be developed that is decentralised in a modus where
industry could come to an arrangement on obligatory
self-regulation with consumer organisations and en-
vironmental organisations. Thus, industry would
benefit from this cooperation by being made alert of
potential risk areas by the civil society organisation,
and NGOs in turn would receive information on new
manufacturing processes and products and also have
the opportunity to ask questions ([19]: 52). With the
following vignette, I explore how the role of the NGO
BUND in the political process was challenged by its
inclusion in the NanoKommission.
Vignette 2—BUND (Friends of the Earth Germany)
in the Nanokommission
While the NanoKommission was at work building
stable conditions for a trustworthy dialogue among
participants, the NGO BUND published a German
version of a critical position paper, which was
composed in a cooperation of 70 NGOs worldwide,
in which they positioned themselves as an NGO
acting on nanotechnology issues. While they were
sitting on the NanoKommission, the most important
German discussion circle, the BUND’s position paper
was published in August 2008, making it clear that
Friends of the Earth Germany were about to challenge
the hegemonic discourse of nanotechnology, in which
nanotechnology leads to a promising future. The
position paper was already preceded by the publica-
tion of a critical study of the BUND published in
March 2008. Both documents addressed the Achilles’
heel of nanotechnology governance: with an attempt
to interrupt these articulations of nanotechnologies
that were linking the field with economic growth and
future well-being. In contrast to the fancy promises of
nanotechnology, it drew a picture of mundane, small
nanotechnology applications sweeping the market,
and warned that these applications might bear risks
for human beings and the environment but might slip
through risk assessment in the mad rush to implement
them. It read:
‘Nanotechnology is praised as a key technology
of the 21st century. Climate change, world
hunger and diseases shall be combated by
means of nanotechnologies. Having a close look
at nanoproducts available on the market is,
however, disenchanting: an increasing and vast
number of daily products with questionable
benefits are urged onto the market, while we
still have to wait for breakthroughs in environ-
ment technologies that the industry had con-
jured. Instead, more and more frequently there
are products on the shelves in the shops that
contain nanomaterials like textiles, food, cos-
metics, cleansing devices, sealing sprays, sports
articles and toys.
At the same time, many open questions remain
unsettled: How do nanomaterials behave if they
are taken up by the body or if they get into the
environment? Can nanomaterials that appear
bound within matter be released through abrasion
or disposal? Should not citizens participate in
decidingthedirectionoftechnologydevelopment,
or should this continue to be left to industry?
While the marketing of nanoproducts continues,
there are no laws worldwide regulating the use
of nanomaterials. […]’
(BUND August 2008)
Thus, the position paper introduced nanotechnology
as something ubiquitous, mundane, potentially harmful,
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picture of nanotechnology as a beneficial development.
The paper outlined the requests of the environmental
organisation: nanotechnology should be approached by
means of the precautionary principle—this included a
moratorium on products for which the safety could not
be proven—because the first results of risk research on
nanomaterials indicated toxicity of certain nanomateri-
als, according to BUND. Thus, an argument of quality
on the interpretation of first-risk studies was made. As
we see below, the toxicologist Harald Krug, professor
for material biology interactions at the Swiss Federal
Government Laboratories for Materials Science and
Technology (EMPA), suggests a different interpretation
of first-risk research results. The principal demand of
BUND was nano-specific, obligatory risk-regulation. In
contrast to other participants of the NanoKommission
who were desiring voluntary codes, this NGO wanted
binding rules on nanotechnology, and, specifically,
compulsory regulations with monitoring and sanctions.
Thus, while the work in the NanoKommission was
going on, the NGO attacked voluntary agreements on
nanomaterials from several angles. The NGO argued
that, without sanctions, companies might skip long-
lasting and costly studies on long-term effects of the
nanomaterials. Another shortcoming of voluntary codes
from their perspective concerned the industry’sb l a c k
sheep: even if those manufacturers who were dedicated
to the environment and to protecting human health
would do a good job on a voluntary basis, exactly those
who needed control most could cause harm ([4]: 5). In
addition to their request for obligatory regulations,
BUND was a proponent of a public register that,
together with product labelling, should lead to trans-
parency—a move that industry rejected due to the data
protection needed in the fierce competition among
companies.
How should the NanoKommission deal with this
strong, public positioning of one of its members?
According to a civil servant interviewed for this study,
the dominant interpretation of this incidence by
members of the NanoKommission was that the NGO
BUND had abused the trust that had accrued during
the work of the commission. The situation created by
the 2008 position paper was said to be very difficult,
and as a result of the breach of trust, this NGO almost
left the dialogue process. Interestingly for this ‘special
issue on nanotechnology and trust’ is that the incident
was mainly formulated as an issue of trust.
Approached from the perspective of Luhmann’s
theory on trust, one could argue that the reactions
unveiled contradictions in the generalised expect-
ations that members of the commission had
concerning the implicit rules of behaviour that
participation in the commission entails. However, this
does not adequately explain the harsh reaction of
accusing the NGO of abusing trust. Approaching it
from an performative perspective, that is, that sitting
on the commission was meant as an attempt to make
all members behave in a certain way, to perform trust
that binds the members into a ‘we’ of governing
nanotechnology together, more accurately describes
the dislocatory potential of the situation. The inclu-
sion into the commission was part of setting the
boundaries of how and where to talk about nanotech-
nology. A similar pattern is shown in vignette 3,
which was not explicitly problematised as a trust issue
in my interviews.
Vignette 3—The Federal Environment Agency Press
Release Incident and Response
OnOctober21,2009,theGermanmagazineDer Spiegel
[30] published an article stating that the Federal
Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt—UbA)
had issued a warning about nanotechnology. The
article reported that nanoparticles in food, clothes
and cosmetics could lead to health risks and that
there were no regulations in place yet. The media
was drawing on a repertoire of fearful resources by
stressing the invisibility of nanoparticles, their
minuteness because of which particles could enter
human cells, where they could potentially damage
the human genome, and by stressing the similarity
of nanotubes to asbestos.
By coincidence, I conducted interviews in Ger-
many shortly after publication of the Der Spiegel
article and subsequent media reports in which the
UbA report was discussed. All interviewees men-
tioned the incident without being prompted about it,
and their reactions ranged from surprise to astonish-
ment to indignation. In the world of nanotechnology
policy making in Germany, the Environment Agency’s
venture faced criticism. The overall impression was that
the Environment Agency might have deliberately issued
‘the warning’ in a time (October 2009) when the
Environment Ministry had no formal leader because of
the recent (September 2009) federal elections and
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Krug, from the EMPA, who a spokesperson of the large
research project consortia NanoCare in Germany, sent
via an email-list an open email, which was later also
published on a website, to the Environment Agency. The
open letter demands answers to seven questions. The
first question asked why the Environment Agency had
referred to knowledge gaps in its press release instead of
referring to the work already done, such as the work of
the NanoKommission, of which the Environment
Agency itself was also a member. Questions 2, 3, 5 and
6 identify ongoing or completed risk research funding
programmesandprojectsandtakeissuewiththefactthat
the Environment Agency had not mentioned them in the
press release. The email also lists study results stating
that nanoparticles do not carry risks. The final question
r e a d sa sf o l l o w s :
‘7. Why do you not speak with experts
beforehand, and why do you not let the
information be proofread before releasing it in
order to avoid misunderstandings instead of
imposing the task on us of having to correct
the picture in the hindsight?’
[18]
This last question is nothing less than a request that
information be approved by the governance network;
it demands the installation of a gatekeeper before
something is made public. The call for experts is bold,
considering that the department of the UbA is staffed
by doctors of biology.
Asked about the incidence in my interview, the
representative of the Federal Environment Agency
explained that they considered themselves badly
misunderstood by the media. An interviewee of the
UbA pointed out discrepancies between the media’s
focus on risks in relation to the presentation of the
UbA; in addition, neither the press release nor the
background report articulates a warning about . The
press release titled ‘Nanotechnology for Humans and
for the Environment—Support Chances, Diminish
Risks’ indeed begins with the consequences of nano-
technologies for the environment—but only from a
positive angle. It suggests that nanotechnology would
bring benefits to the society and the environment, for
instance, because lighter materials allow for the
construction of lighter cars and lighter air planes,
thereby reducing their petrol demand; or because
nanotechnology-optimized lamps use electricity more
efficiently and thus nanotechnology helps save energy.
Then of course, the press release also mentions that the
increased use of synthetic nanomaterials in products
entails an increased prevalence of these materials in the
environment. The effects of these materials on the
environment and on human health, it states, are
insufficiently researched:
‘Nanotechnology offers substantial potential for
ecological product innovations, but as well risks
for the environment and for human health.
There are serious knowledge gaps. It follows
from that an extensive need for research and
regulation. […] The UbA recommends: The use
of products which contain and might release
nanomaterials should be avoided—as long as
their consequences for human beings and the
environment are to a large extent unknown.’
[34]
Even if the Federal Environment Agency did not
exactly warn about nanotechnology in this release,
it suggested a kind of voluntary moratorium, not a
moratorium decided by regulators but a consumer
suspension of using these products. The press
release was issued on the occasion of a 2009
update of a background paper on nanotechnology.
That 22-page report has three main sections:
potential relief of environmental problems through
nanotechnologies (Umweltentlastungspotentiale),
potential problems for the environment and for
human health by nanotechnologies (Umweltbelas-
tungspotentiale), and the activities of the Environ-
ment Agency in the field. Overall, the UbA report
presents a review of ongoing research activities and
formulates demands such as further risk research,
further research into providing evidence for positive
effects of nanomaterials, and a recommendation to
treat nanomaterials products cautiously as long as
we do not know more.
While the Environment Agency did already in the
introduction of the report what Harald Krug had in
hindsight demanded from the agency—refer to different
risk research programmes that were funded by the
government and the EU—the UbA and Krug showed
different emphases intheir interpretations oftheresultsof
such risk research programmes. Krug focused on studies
that showed that nanoparticles in, for example, sun
cream, were not taken up by the skin cells and provided
better skin protection and less severe problems for
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cream. The Environment Agency’s, however, drew
attention to risk research on nanotechnology, finding that
‘The present risk research project on nano-
materials […] indicates potential toxic effects
of nanomaterials and gives cause for further
research: It is currently too early for a wide-
reaching risk evaluation because toxicological
long-term examinations are missing and often
there are no data about eco-toxicological con-
sequences available.’
[34]
Thus, while one person prioritized first results that
indicate there were no risks deriving from nano-
technologies, the other group focused on negative
results. What was not spelled out after the incident, or
even masked over, was the conflict of contradictory
interpretations of risk result—a theme also repre-
sented in the incident with the NGO BUND in
vignette 2 above.
The extent and consequences of this UbA incident
must not be misunderstood. To clarify: media reports
d i dn o tc a u s ea no u t c r yi np u b l i c ,n o rd i dt h e
incidence bring to an end any co-operation with the
Federal Environment Agency in nanotechnology
policymaking. But the reason for presenting the case
here is that it reveals something about nanotechnol-
ogy politics in Germany. First, what does it mean that
most interviewees suspect that the Environment
Agency acts because it had no formal leadership at
the time? Second, it shows how alert actors involved
in nanotechnology governance were; how they sitting
in waiting to immediately police any transgression of
silently defined borders of what can be said about
nanotechnology and what can not. What I observed
from the interviews I conducted after the press release
was that the beams of the carefully erected, interwo-
ven scaffolding of German nanotechnology politics
were creaking. A discussion was triggered about what
to let out of this scaffolding towards the ears of the
wider public. The previously unsaid agreement was
voiced that worries about nanotechnologies should be
discussed internally within predefined and designated
settings, such as the NanoKommission or the Nano-
Care research project, instead of starting a discussion
in an open arena constituted by the media, where the
uptake of the message and responses to potential
worries cannot be controlled.
Discussion: Against Dismissing the Political
We can apply the notion of a ‘governance network’
on stakeholder forums such as the NanoKommission.
Governance networks can be defined as
‘A relatively stable, horizontal articulation of
interdependent, but operationally autonomous
actors who interact through negotiations that
take place within a relatively institutionalized
community which is self-regulating within
limits set by external agencies and contributes
to the production of public purpose.’
([32]: 5)
The possible merits of governance networks are as
manifold as their various appearances. Because of
their flexible and complex structures, they are, for
example, considered as suiting for solving wicked
problems by integrating actors, who might not have
had a voice in traditional policy making, thus
providing for a better basis for the acceptance of the
policy output and contributing with their special
knowledge. As an advantage, the resources, capacities
and energies of private actors, which have been
wasted earlier, are used, and the intense dialogical
character of network participation generates mutual
trust and knowledge ([32]: 13). Nevertheless, the
claim is not unchallenged that governance networks
lead to a more effective and democratic governance.
Evaluated against traditions of liberal democracy,
governance networks contradict democratic standards
such as representation, free and equal access, and
transparency. ([29]:200) In short, opening up the
governance process can have side effects, such as
new channels of influence, illegitimacy of the actors
involved and the weakening of the established
democratic system. However, in this case, the Nano-
Kommission cannot be reproached for involving
illegitimate actors. The commission has to be seen
in a long tradition of Konzertierung—concerted
action among social partners—in Germany. Normal
German politics takes place in the administrative
realm in properly constituted expert committees that
‘function as miniworlds of reason: they aim to
encompass within them the capacity to articulate all
relevant arguments and to produce a consensus that is
binding on society because it is, in effect, the
consensus that society would have reached if it had
been able to deliberate in common’ ([16]: 289).
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that it was weakening the established democratic
system, because its explicit aim was to establish a
consensus among stakeholders before the topic
became politicised.
Indeed, the peculiarity of the NanoKommission is
that it was active before normal politics started to
work: it was conceptualised as pre-political discourse
process. ‘Pre-political’ has two different meanings in
this respect. First, it refers to ‘pre-politics’, that is, the
aim to locate the politics of defining the policy
problem away from conventional politics, such as
party politics. Representing a cornerstone of the
‘responsible development of nanotechnologies’ with
genetic modification as the ‘dismissed other’, the
NanoKommission was the counterpart to the Enquiry
Commission on Biotechnology, which was founded in
1984. As with the NanoKommission, the aim of a
commission enquiring into biotechnology was to
examine ‘the prospects and risks’, and the commis-
sion was chaired by Wolf-Michael Catenhusen. There
are, however, considerable differences between the
two commissions. The biotechnology commission
was established in a context of the rise of social
movements in Germany, controversies on nuclear
power and the Green Party being voted into parlia-
ment in 1983 ([16]: 59). Being an official advisory
instrument of the parliament, the biotechnology
commission was properly vested with staff and
decision-making-power; participants were politicians
(represented according to their representation in
parliament) and experts; and the commission was
institutionalised on demand of party fractions in the
parliament (an alliance of the Green Party and the
Social Democrats) (ibid.). Thus, the Enquiry Com-
mission was part of the parliamentary chain of
governance, whereas the NanoKommission worked
on behalf of the Environment Ministry and had only
loose, informal bonds to the parliament. In contrast to
the Enquiry Commission, the NanoKommission
aimed at discussions taking place in this newly
established governance network dislocated from
normal politics.
The second sense of ‘pre-political’ in the Nano-
Kommission’s ‘pre-political discourse process” means
to avoid contestation and polarisation. The institu-
tionalisation of these new arrangements between
industry and NGOs was not considered to run
smoothly from the beginning. The chair of the
NanoKommission was implemented as a central point
to prevent forces, which appeared to have the
likelihood of pushing off of each other, of moving
away from the centre. Since the overall policy
narrative situated nanotechnology within the context
of former technology debates, initiators of the
commission imagined the two opposing ends of the
magnet to be NGOs on the one hand and industry on
the other. Asked for his interpretation of why he was
asked to assume the chair of the NanoKommission,
Wolf-Michael Catenhusen said:
‘This is maybe connected to members of the
ministry of environment knowing my efforts in
other technology politics discourses in Ger-
many. Maybe they trusted that I have good
foundations of trust with many stakeholders.’
(Wolf-Michael Catenhusen, interview material)
We see how trust is a highly valuated quality in
establishing nanotechnology governance in Germany
with its general aim of reaching consensus. It is this
aim of ‘reaching consensus’ I would like to problem-
atise because we should not try to dream of a society
without disagreements:
‘In politics the public interest is always a matter
of debate and a final agreement can never be
reached; to imagine such a situation is to dream
of a society without politics. One should not
hope for the elimination of disagreement but for
its containment within forms that respect the
existence of liberal democratic institutions.’
([25]: 50)
In general, any assessment of the democratic
quality depends on the democratic norms against
which networks are evaluated. Proponents of tradi-
tional liberal theories of democracy argue that
governance networks undermine traditional institu-
tions of elected governments (e.g., decision makers
are not voted into the network) ([33]: 126). In
contrast, Sørensen and Torfing [29] posit that gover-
nance networks might as well stimulate the develop-
ment of new forms of democracy. Torfing [32, 33])
suggests that governance networks can prove demo-
cratic quality if they fulfil democratic demands such as
that actors can contribute critically to defining and
solving policy problems, that participation is facilitated
by ambiguous terms (e.g. responsible development),
that alternative views and critique is reacted upon, and
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provided for (2007: 127). In the NanoKommission,
opposing views were thoroughly discussed and the
final report allows for ambiguity and conflicting views.
For example, the report discusses how it was impos-
sible to give a general answer on risk-questions
concerning nanomaterials due to their diversity and
various application contexts:
‘Considered from a scientific angle, general
statements on nanotechnology cannot yet be
seriously taken. But such simple answers are
looked for by the public debate. Maybe the
challenge is to deal with the inevitable com-
plexity, to communicate this complexity and to
make these steps of evaluating chances and risks
transparent.’
[26]
This vagueness of the report represents a positioning
in a field of ambiguity, uncertainty and complexity that
does not aim at overcoming these fallacies for regula-
tion. Overall, the final report rather reads like a
discussion paper rather than the closure of a debate.
The section by working group 3 on the ‘responsible
development of nanomaterials’ even included a para-
graph with the subheading ‘Aspects Where We Could
Not Reach Consensus.’ The open style of the document
ispartofitsaimtoavoidpolarisation,andthe allowance
for opposing views can be traced to the social logics of
writing the report. Thus, measured against the demo-
cratic demands introduced by Torfing, the NanoKom-
mission did a good job.
Nevertheless, these ‘miniworlds of reason’ stage
publics and bring relations among ‘stakeholders’ into
being that did not exist before their cooperation. I
suggest that these efforts to avoid polarisation are
based on a simplified conception of ‘the political’ as
politics of predefined interests that have to be
overcome. It ignores that ‘social relations take shape
and are symbolically formed’ ([25]: 11) at the
political level. Thus, we have to draw attention to
‘the identity of the ‘we’ that is going to be created
through a specific form of collective action’ (Pitkin
after [25]: 50), such as a NanoKommission. By
relating different interests to the common project of
‘the responsible development of nanotechnology’,a
temporal unity among the members of the Nano-
Kommission might be reached that also transforms
subject positions because subjects are woven into new
constellations of social relations that generate trust
and mutual responsibilities. If due to the efforts in
stakeholder forums such as the NanoKommission,
adversary claims are no longer publicly articulated,
the project was successful in preventing a public
politisation. At the same time, this is a political
outcome because the NanoKommission contributes to
ordering social relations. Thus, the NanoKommission
cannot claim to be a pre-political discourse process.
If we relate this back to the general context of
public engagement in nanotechnology, my argument
is that important political decisions are concealed by
their displacement into supposedly pre-political set-
tings—a concealment which conflicts with ideals of
transparency in deliberative democracy. This paper
problematised the articulation of new governance
instruments into deliberative ideals. The political in
the seemingly apolitical must be highlighted in order
to identify potential democratic pitfalls of new
governance instruments. In the three vignettes, I
showed three performative effects of ‘coming together
in stakeholder forums’, which are political: identity
formation, policing information and—as I will discuss
in the next paragraph—setting the borders of what is
discussable.
The practices of coming together in stakeholder
forums produce constraints and opportunities for the
relation between nanotechnology and society. When
the members of the commission try to make sense of
this vague thing nanotechnology is, they enact the
relationship between nanotechnology and society in a
way which implies that certain issues are ruled off the
agenda. As Finlayson put it, they contribute to setting
the boundaries of the political argument:
‘Arguments of place are attempts to set the
boundaries of political argument and may be
particularly important since to rule certain issues
off the agenda is to win before argument has
begun.’
([8]: 555)
All three vignettes point to a policing of what is to be
said about nanotechnology and what is not to be said in
German nanotechnology governance. The boundaries of
transgression are enacted by participating in new
governance arrangements. The bitter response of Harald
Krug to the UbA press release and the strong reaction of
members in the NanoKommission on the BUND’s
position paper hint at what was not sayable in nanotech-
126 Nanoethics (2011) 5:115–128nology governance; it hints at the limits of the discourse.
The UbA broke a taboo—a taboo that had not been
spelled out before but which became obvious by the act
of breaking it. When defining the policy problem of
nanotechnology and developing recommendations like
codes of conduct in governance networks, participants
are not only exchanging arguments, ‘but [this is] also a
performative process in which the boundaries of argu-
mentation are defined’ ([12]: 245). The demand that
certain information should not reach the public, which
w a se x p r e s s e db yK r u gi nh i so p e ne m a i la sw e l la sb y
the interviewee in the first vignette, show that acting
together in governance networks produces constraints.
I argue thatinthese new governance mechanisms that
are applied in nanotechnology, new identities are
developing. A ‘we’ in governing arises among previous-
ly disparate stakeholders. The output of these forums or
interdisciplinary research projects might not so much be
the recommendations such as the codes of conduct that
are issued but the most important output could be new
relations of trust among the political actors. Governance
in practice assembles new collectives and relations of
trust are the glue of these complex structures.
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